The goal of general-purpose program obfuscation is to make an arbitrary computer program "unintelligible" while preserving its functionality. At least as far back as the work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976, researchers have contemplated applications of general-purpose obfuscation. However, until 2013, even heuristic constructions for general-purpose obfuscation were not known.
Introduction
The goal of general-purpose program obfuscation is to make an arbitrary computer program "unintelligible" while preserving its functionality. At least as far back as the work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76] 1 , researchers have contemplated applications of general-purpose obfuscation. The first mathematical definitions of obfuscation were given by Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang in 2001 [BGI + 01] 2 , who also enumerated several additional applications of general-purpose obfuscation, ranging from software intellectual property protection and removing random oracles, to eliminating software watermarks. However, until 2013, even heuristic constructions for general-purpose obfuscation were not known.
This changed with the work of Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters in 2013 [GGH + 13b], which gave the first candidate construction of general-purpose obfuscation, accomplished in two steps: The heart of their construction is an obfuscator for log-depth (NC 1 ) circuits, building upon a simplified subset of the Approximate Multilinear Maps framework of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [GGH13a] that they call Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. They proved that their construction achieves the notion called indistinguishability obfuscation (see below for further explanation), under a complex new intractability assumption. Then, they bootstrap this construction to work for all circuits, proving their transformation secure under the Learning with Error (LWE) assumption, a well-studied intractability assumption.
Given the importance of general-purpose obfuscation, it is imperative that we gain as much confidence as possible in candidates for general-purpose obfuscation. The [GGH + 13b] candidate relies on Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles: The work of [GGH13a] gives considerable cryptanalytic evidence of the security of their multilinear maps framework, and only a subset of the attacks considered there apply to the simplified Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles setting, offering even greater confidence. Furthermore, there is already an alternative mathematical basis [CLT13] for building Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles.
Our result: Protecting against algebraic attacks. However, aside from the security of the underlying multilinear map instantiation, there is another basic concern: Do there exist algebraic attacks (that respect multilinear maps, see below for more details) against candidate constructions of general-purpose obfuscation? Indeed, [GGH + 13b] pose the problem of proving that there exist no generic multilinear attacks against their core NC 1 scheme as a major open problem in their work 3 . Solving this problem will give us essential evidence that mathematical approaches to general purpose obfuscation introduced in [GGH + 13b] are sound. This problem was first addressed in the recent work of Brakerski and Rothblum [BR13] , who constructed a variant of the [GGH + 13b] candidate obfuscator, and proved that it achieves the strongest definition of security for general-purpose obfuscation -Virtual Black Box (VBB) security -against all generic multilinear attacks, albeit under an unproven assumption they introduce as the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis, which strengthens the Exponential Time Hypothesis.
In this work, we resolve the open problem of [GGH + 13b] completely, by removing the need for this additional assumption. More specifically, we describe a different (and arguably simpler) variant of the construction of [GGH + 13b], for which we can prove that it achieves Virtual Black Box security against all generic multilinear attacks, with no further assumptions.
Algebraic attacks and Notions of Security. In this work, we focus on arguing security against a large class of natural algebraic attacks, captured in the generic multilinear model. Intuitively speaking, the generic 1 Diffie and Hellman suggested the use of general-purpose obfuscation to convert private-key cryptosystems to public-key cryptosystems. 2 The work of [BGI + 01] is best known for their constructions of specific "unobfuscatable" classes of functions {fs} that roughly have the property that given any circuit evaluating fs, one can extract the secret s. However, given only black-box access to fs, the secret s is hidden. We will discuss the implications of this for our setting below. 3 An unconditional proof that the [GGH + 13b] assumption resists generic colored matrix model attacks is given in [GGH + 13b]. However, this generic colored matrix model assumes that an adversary can only attack by performing a very limited subset of matrix operations, and does not prove any security against an adversary that can perform algebraic attacks against individual encodings of elements in Zp.
multilinear model imagines an exponential-size collection of "groups" {G S }, where the subscript S denotes a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Each of these groups is a separate copy of Z p , under addition, for some fixed large random prime p. The adversary is initially given some collection of elements from various groups. However, the only way that the adversary can process elements of these groups is through access to an oracle M that performs the following three operations 4 :
• Addition: G S × G S → G S , defined in the natural way over Z p , for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
• Negation: G S → G S , defined in the natural way over Z p , for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
• Multiplication: G S × G T → G S∪T , defined in the natural way over Z p , for all S, T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k}, where S ∩ T = ∅. Note that the constraint that S ∩ T = ∅ intuitively captures why we call this a multilinear model.
These operations capture precisely the algebraic operations supported by the Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles of [GGH + 13b]. With the algebraic attack model defined, the next step is to consider what security property we would like to achieve with respect to this attack model. We first recall two security notions for obfuscationindistinguishability obfuscation (iO) security and Virtual Black-Box (VBB) security -and state them both in comparable language, in the generic multilinear model. Below, we write "generic adversary" or "generic distinguisher" to refer to an algorithm that has access to the oracle M described above.
Indistinguishability obfuscation 5 requires that for every polynomial-time generic adversary, there exists an computationally unbounded simulator, such that for every circuit C, no polynomial-time generic distinguisher can distinguish the output of the adversary given the obfuscation of C as input, from the output of the simulator given oracle access to C, where the simulator can make an unbounded number of queries to C. Virtual Black-Box obfuscation 6 requires that for every polynomial-time generic adversary, there exists a polynomial-time simulator, such that for every circuit C, no polynomial-time generic distinguisher can distinguish the output of the adversary given the obfuscation of C as input, from the output of the simulator given oracle access to C, where the simulator can make a polynomial number of queries to C.
In our work, we focus on proving the Virtual Black-Box definition of security against generic attacks. We do so for several reasons:
• Our first, and most basic, reason is that proving Virtual Black-Box security against generic multilinear attacks is, mathematically speaking, the strongest result we could hope to prove. As we can see from the definitions above, the definition of security provided by the VBB definition is significantly stronger than the indistinguishability obfuscation definition. As such, it represents the natural end-goal for research on proving resilience to such algebraic attacks.
This may seem surprising in light of the negative results of [BGI + 01], who showed that there exist (contrived) families of "unobfuscatable" functions for which the VBB definition is impossible to achieve in the plain model. However, we stress that this result does not apply to security against generic multilinear attacks. Thus it does not present a barrier to the goal of proving VBB security against generic multilinear attacks.
• Given the existence of "unobfuscatable" function families, how can we interpret a result showing VBB security against generic attacks, in terms of the real-world applicability of obfuscation? One plausible interpretation is that it offers heuristic evidence that our obfuscation mechanism will offer strong 4 In the technical exposition, we discuss how it is enforced that the adversary can only access the elements of the group via the oracles. For this intuitive exposition, we ask the reader to simply imagine that an algebraic adversary is defined to be limited in this way.
5 The formulation of indistinguishability obfuscation sketched here was used, for example, in [GGH + 13b]. 6 We note that we are referring to a stronger definition of VBB obfuscation than the one given in [BGI + 01], which limits the adversary to only outputting one bit. In our definition, the adversary can output arbitrary length strings. This stronger formulation of VBB security implies all other known meaningful security definitions for obfuscation, including natural definitions that are not known to be implied by the one-bit-output formulation of VBB security.
security for "natural" functions. This would suggest that unobfuscatable functions are very rare and unusual, because attacks against the obfuscations of such functions must necessarily treat numbers embedded in the obfuscations not as algebraic objects, but as bit-strings to be processed outside the natural algebraic framework in which they arise. We stress, however, that our result cannot offer any specific theoretical guidance on which function families can be VBB-obfuscated in the plain model, and which cannot.
• Finally, our VBB result against generic attacks suggests that there is a significant gap between what security is actually achieved by our candidate in the plain model, and the best security definitions for obfuscation that we have in the plain model. This suggests a natural research agenda for exploring new definitions of security for obfuscation: We suggest that after the formulation of new meaningful relaxations of VBB security, one should look at our candidate and our proof of VBB as giving a reduction to a concrete plausible intractability assumption. For example, if one takes the indistinguishability obfuscation definition, our VBB proof gives a reduction to a concrete assumption that is unrelated to our specific obfuscation candidate (see below for more details). [BR13] . For this discussion of our techniques, we will assume that the reader has some familiarity with the [GGH + 13b] construction. Our construction and analysis deviates from the [GGH + 13b] construction and analysis in two essential ways: The first, and most important, deviation is that we employ specially designed set systems in our use of the generic multilinear model: Roughly speaking, in the original work of [GGH + 13b], the underlying elements that make up the obfuscated program live in groups G S where S is a singleton set, such as S = {1}. In contrast, in our obfuscation, while the actual elements from Z p that we use are very similar to those used in [GGH + 13b], these elements will live in groups G S where the sets S will come from specially designed set systems. Our use of set systems can be viewed abstractly as proceeding in two steps, which serve critical and interrelated purposes to enable our proof of VBB against generic attacks:
• First, we design a basic straddling set system that is used to prevent an adversary from "mixing inputs": that is, if the adversary has chosen a particular input location x i to be set to 0, then we use this set system to prevent the adversary from later carrying out another portion of the computation as if x i = 1. Roughly speaking, this will be because some elements corresponding to x i = 0 will live in a group G S , while some elements corresponding to x i = 1 will live in a group G T , where S ∩ T = ∅. Thus, these elements will be multiplicatively incompatible, and the adversary will be forced to be consistent with respect to its choice of inputs. (We note that protection against such mixing of inputs was handled differently in [GGH + 13b, BR13], discussed briefly below.) In other words, the adversary is forced to "commit" to its choice of x i , and then be consistent with this commitment from that point onwards.
• We then bootstrap the above idea to force the adversary to commit to his entire input before he can finish "processing" any one input location x i . We do so by creating interlocking sets that combine several copies of the straddling set systems above. These interlocking sets ensure that in order to process an input x i , the adversary must commit to its values for all {x j } j =i . By forcing the adversary to commit to its entire input, we prevent the adversary from creating polynomials that combine terms corresponding to a super-polynomial set of different inputs. In contrast, in the recent work of [BR13] , this was accomplished by means of a reduction to the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis. Our generic proof building upon our set systems, on the other hand, is unconditional.
The second deviation in our construction from that of [GGH + 13b] is in our usage of the α i,b random scalar values that appeared in [GGH + 13b] . In that work, these random scalars α i,b were used for two purposes: First, they were chosen with specific multiplicative constraints in order to prevent "input mixing" attacks as described above (a similar multiplicative bundling method was used by [BR13] as well). As noted above, we no longer need this use of the α i,b values as this is handled by our set systems. The second purpose these values served was to provide a "per-input" randomization in polynomial terms created by the adversary. We do continue the use of this role of the α i,b values, leveraging this "per-input" randomization using a method of explicitly invoking Kilian's randomization technique. While the connection to Kilian's randomization technique was made in [GGH + 13b], the way in which we use it in our proof is similar to (but arguably simpler than) the beautiful use of Kilian's randomization technique in the recent work of [BR13] .
Preliminaries
In this section we define the notion of "virtual black-box" obfuscation in an idealized model, we recall the definition of branching programs and describe a "dual-input" variant of branching programs used in our construction.
"Virtual Black-Box" Obfuscation in an Idealized Model
Let M be some oracle. We define obfuscation in the M-idealized model. In this model, both the obfuscator and the evaluator have access to the oracle M. However, the function family that is being obfuscated does not have access to M Definition 1 ("Virtual Black-Box" Obfuscation in an M-idealized model). For a (possibly randomized) oracle M, and a circuit class {C } ∈N , we say that a uniform PPT oracle machine O is a "Virtual BlackBox" Obfuscator for {C } ∈N in the M-idealized model, if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Functionality: For every ∈ N, every C ∈ C , every input x to C, and for every possible coins for M:
where the probability is over the coins of O.
• Polynomial Slowdown: there exist a polynomial p such that for every ∈ N and every C ∈ C , we have that
• Virtual Black-Box: for every PPT adversary A there exist a PPT simulator S, and a negligible function µ such that for all PPT distinguishers D, for every ∈ N and every C ∈ C :
where the probabilities are over the coins of D,A,S,O and M Remark 1. We note that the definition above is stronger than the definition of VBB obfuscation given in [BGI + 01], in that it allows adversaries to output an unbounded number of bits.
Definition 2 ("Virtual Black-Box" Obfuscation for NC 1 in an M-idealized model). We say that O is a "Virtual Black-Box" Obfuscator for NC 1 in the M-idealized model, if for every circuit class C = {C } ∈N such that every circuit in C is of size poly( ) and of depth O(log( )), O is a "Virtual Black-Box" Obfuscator for C in the M-idealized model.
Branching Programs
The focus of this paper is on obfuscating branching programs, which are known to be powerful enough to simulate NC 1 circuits. A branching program consists of a sequence of steps, where each step is defined by a pair of permutations. In each step the the program examines one input bit, and depending on its value the program chooses one of the permutations. The program outputs 1 if and only if the multiplications of the permutations chosen in all steps is the identity permutation.
Definition 3 (Oblivious Matrix Branching Program)
. A branching program of width w and length n for -bit inputs is given by a permutation matrix P reject ∈ {0, 1} w×w such that P reject = I w×w , and by a sequence:
, where each B i,b is a permutation matrix in {0, 1} w×w , and inp(i) ∈ [ ] is the input bit position examined in step i. The output of the branching program on input x ∈ {0, 1} is as follows: Remark 2. In our obfuscation construction we do not require that the branching program is of constant width. In particular we can use any reductions that result in a polynomial size branching program.
In our construction we will obfuscate a variant of branching programs that we call dual-input branching programs. Instead of reading one input bit in every step, a dual-input branching program inspects a pair of input bits and chooses a permutation based on the values of both bits.
Definition 4 (Dual-Input Branching Program).
A Oblivious dual-input branching program of width w and length n for -bit inputs is given by a permutation matrix P reject ∈ {0, 1} w×w such that P reject = I w×w , and by a sequence
, where each B i,b1,b2 is a permutation matrix in {0, 1}
w×w , and inp 1 (i), inp 2 (i) ∈ [ ] are the positions of the input bits inspected in step i. The output of the branching program on input x ∈ {0, 1} is as follows:
As before, the dual-input branching program is said to be oblivious if both Note that any branching program can be simulated by a dual-input branching program with the same width and length, since the dual-input branching program can always "ignore" one input bit in each pair. Moreover, note that any dual-input branching program can be simulated by a branching program with the same width and with length that is twice the length of the dual-input branching program.
Straddling Set System
In this section, we define the notion of a straddling set system, and prove combinatorial properties regarding this set system. This set system will be an ingredient in our construction, and the combinatorial properties that we establish will be used in our generic proof of security.
Definition 5. A straddling set system with n entries is a collection of sets
and for every distinct non-empty sets C, D ⊆ S n we have that if:
1. (Disjoint Sets:) C contains only disjoint sets. D contains only disjoint sets.
Then, it must be that ∃ b ∈ {0, 1}:
Therefore, in a straddling set system, the only exact covers of the universe U are
, b ∈ {0, 1}}, over the universe U = {1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1}, where:
The proof that Construction 1 satisfies the definition of a straddling set system is straightforward and is given in Appendix A.
The Ideal Graded Encoding Model
In this section describe the ideal graded encoding model where all parties have access to an oracle M, implementing an ideal graded encoding. The oracle M implements an idealized and simplified version of the graded encoding schemes from [GGH13a] . Roughly, M will maintain a list of elements and will allow a user to perform valid arithmetic operations over these elements. We start by defining the an algebra over elements.
Definition 6. Given a ring R and a universe set U , an element is a pair (α, S) where α ∈ R is the value of the element and S ⊆ U is the index of the element. Given an element e we denote by α(e) the value of the element, and we denote by S(e) the index of the element. We also define the following binary operations over elements:
• For two elements e 1 , e 2 such that S(e 1 ) = S(e 2 ), we define e 1 + e 2 to be the element (α(e 1 ) + α(e 2 ), S(e 1 )), and e 1 − e 2 to be the element (α(e 1 ) − α(e 2 ), S(e 1 )).
• For two elements e 1 , e 2 such that S(e 1 ) ∩ S(e 2 ) = ∅, we define e 1 · e 2 to be the element (α(e 1 ) · α(e 2 ), S(e 1 ) ∪ S(e 2 )).
Next we describe the oracle M. M is a stateful oracle mapping elements to "generic" representations called handles. Given handles to elements, M allows the user to perform operations on the elements. M will implement the following interfaces:
Initialization. M will be initialized with a ring R, a universe set U , and a list L of initial elements. For every element e ∈ L, M generates a handle. We do not specify how the handles are generated, but only require that the value of the handles are independent of the elements being encoded, and that the handles are distinct (even if L contains the same element twice). M maintains a handle table where it saves the mapping from elements to handles. M outputs the handles generated for all the element in L. After M has been initialize, all subsequent calls to the initialization interfaces fail.
Algebraic operations. Given two input handles h 1 , h 2 and an operation • ∈ {+, −, ·}, M first locates the relevant elements e 1 , e 2 in the handle table. If any of the input handles does not appear in the handle table (that is, if the handle was not previously generated by M) the call to M fails. If the expression e 1 • e 2 is undefined (i.e., S(e 1 ) = S(e 2 ) for • ∈ {+, −}, or S(e 1 ) ∩ S(e 2 ) = ∅ for • ∈ {·}) the call fails. Otherwise, M generates a new handle for e 1 • e 2 , saves this element and the new handle in the handle table, and returns the new handle.
Zero testing. Given an input handle h, M first locates the relevant element e in the handle table. If h does not appear in the handle table (that is, if h was not previously generated by M) the call to M fails. If S(e) = U the call fails. Otherwise, M returns 1 if α(e) = 0, and returns 0 if α(e) = 0.
Obfuscation in the Ideal Graded Encoding Model
In this section we describe our "virtual black-box" obfuscator O for NC 1 in the ideal graded encoding model.
Input. The obfuscator O takes as input a circuit and transforms it into an oblivious dual-input branching program BP of width w and length n for -bit inputs:
Recall that each B i,b1,b2 is a permutation matrix in {0, 1} w×w , and inp 1 (i), inp 2 (i) ∈ [ ] are the positions of the input bits inspected in step i. Without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions on the structure of the brunching program BP:
• In every step BP inspects two different input bits; that is, for every step i ∈ [n], we have inp 1 (i) = inp 2 (i).
• Every pair of different input bits are inspected in some step of BP; that is, for every
• Every bit of the input is inspected by BP exactly times. More precisely, for input bit j ∈ [ ], we denote by ind(j) the set of steps that inspect the j'th bit:
We assume that for every input bit j ∈ [ ], |ind(j)| = . Note that in every step, the j'th input bit can be inspected at most once.
Randomizing. Next, the Obfuscator O "randomizes" the branching program BP as follows. First, O samples a prime p of length O(n) , Then, O samples random and independent elements as follows:
• Pair of vectors s, t ∈ Z w p .
• n + 1 random full-rank matrices R 0 , R 1 , . . . , R n ∈ Z w×w p .
Finally, O computes the pair of vectors:
0 ,t = R n · t , and for every i ∈ [n] and b 1 , b 2 ∈ {0, 1}, O computes the matrix:
Initialization. For every j ∈ [ ], let S j be a straddling set system with entries over a set U j , such that the sets U 1 , . . . , U are disjoint. Let U = j∈[ ] U j , and let B s and B t be sets such that U, B s , B t are disjoint. We associate the set system S j with the j'th input bit. We index the elements of S j by the steps of the branching program BP that inspect the j'th input. Namely,
For every step i ∈ [n] and bits b 1 , b 2 ∈ {0, 1} we denote by S(i, b 1 , b 2 ) the union of pairs of sets that are indexed by i:
.
Note that by the way we defined the set ind(j) for input bit j ∈ [ ], and by the way the elements of S j are indexed, indeed, S
. O initializes the oracle M with the ring Z p , the universe set U ∪ B s ∪ B t and with the following initial elements: 
Output. The obfuscator O outputs a circuit O(BP) that has all the handles received from the Initialization stage hardcoded into it. Given access to the oracle M, O(BP) can add and multiply handles. 
On input x, O(BP) obtains the following handles:
O(BP) uses the oracle M to subtract the handle h from h and performs a zero test on the result. If the zero test outputs 1 then O(BP) outputs 1, and otherwise O(BP) outputs 0.
Correctness. By construction we have that as long as none of the calls to the oracle M fail, subtracting the handle h from h results in a handle to 0 if and only if:
From the definition of the branching program we have:
Thus, if BP(x) = 1 then O(BP) outputs 1 with probability 1. If BP(x) = 0 then O(BP) outputs 1 with probability at most 1/p = negl(n) over the choice of s and t.
It is left to show that none of the calls to the oracle M fail. Note that when multiplying two matrices of
, none of the addition or multiplication calls fail as long as S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅. Therefore, to show that none of the addition or multiplication calls to M fail, it is enough to show that following sets are disjoint: 2 ) and with the fact that for every set system S j , for every distinct i, i ∈ ind(j), and for every b ∈ {0, 1}, we have that
To show that the zero testing call to the oracle M does not fail we need to show that the index set of the elements corresponding to h and h is the entire universe. Namely, we need to show that
which follows from the following equalities:
Proof of VBB in the The Ideal Graded Encoding Model
In this section we prove that the obfuscator O described in Section 5 is a good VBB obfuscator for NC 1 in the ideal graded encoding model. Let C = {C } ∈N be a circuit class such that every circuit in C is of size poly( ) and of depth O(log ). We assume WLOG that all circuits in C are of the same depth (otherwise the circuit can be padded). It follows from Theorem 1 that there exist polynomial functions n and w such that on input circuit C ∈ C , the branching program BP computed by O is of size n(|C|), width w(|C|), and computes on (|C|)-bit inputs.
In Section 5 we showed that O satisfies the functionality requirement where the probability of O computing the wrong output is negligible in n. Since n is a polynomial function of |C| we get that the functionality error is negligible in |C|, as required. It is straightforward to verify that O also satisfies the polynomial slowdown property. In the rest of this section we prove that O satisfies the virtual black-box property.
The simulator. To prove that O satisfies the virtual black-box property, we construct a simulator Sim that is given 1 |C| , the description of an adversary A, and oracle access to the circuit C. Sim starts by emulating the obfuscation algorithm O. Recall that O converts the circuit C into a branching program BP. However, since Sim is not given C it cannot compute the matrices B i,b1,b2 in the description of BP (note that Sim can compute the input mapping functions inp 1 , inp 2 since the branching program is oblivious). Without knowing the B matrices, Sim cannot simulate the list of initial elements to the oracle M. Instead Sim initializes M with formal variables.
Concretely, we extend the definition of an element to allow for values that are formal variables, as opposed to ring elements. When performing an operation • on elements e 1 , e 2 that contain formal variables, the value of the resulting element e 1 • e 2 is just the formal arithmetic expression α(e 1 ) • α(e 2 ) (assuming the indexes of the elements are such that the operation is defined). We represent formal expressions as arithmetic circuits, thereby guaranteeing that the representation size remains polynomial. We say that an element is basic if its value is an expression that contains no gates (i.e., its just a formal variable). We say that an element e is a sub-element of an element e if e was generated from e through a sequence of operations.
To emulate O, Sim must also emulate the oracle M that O accesses. Sim can efficiently emulate all the interfaces of M except for the zero testing. The problem with simulating zero tests is that Sim cannot test if the value of a formal expression is 0. Note however that the emulation of O does not make any zero-test queries to M (zero-test queries are made only by the evaluator).
When Sim completes the emulation of O it obtains a simulated obfuscationÕ(C). Sim proceeds to emulate the execution of the adversary A on inputÕ(C). When A makes an oracle call that is not a zero test, Sim emulates M's answer (note that emulation of the oracle M is stateful and will therefore use the same handle table to emulate both O and A). Since the distribution of handles generated during the simulation and during the real execution are identical, and since the simulated obfuscationÕ(C) consists only of handles (as opposed to elements), we have that the simulation of the obfuscationÕ(C) and the simulation of M's answers to all the queries, except for zero-test queries, is perfect.
Simulating zero testing queries. In the rest of the proof we describe how the simulator correctly simulates zero-test queries made by A. Simulating the zero-test queries is non-trivial since the handle being tested may correspond to a formal expression whose value is unknown to Sim. (The "real" value of the formal variables depend on the circuit C). Instead we show how Sim can efficiently simulate the zero-test queries given oracle access to the circuit C.
The high-level strategy for simulating zero-test queries is as follows. Given a handle to some element, Sim tests if the value of the element is zero in two parts. In the first part, Sim decomposes the element into a sum of polynomial number of "simpler" elements that we call single-input elements. Each single-input element has a value that depends on a subset of the formal variables that correspond to a specific input to the branching program. Namely, for every single-input element there exists x ∈ {0, 1} such that the value of the element only depends on the formal variables in the matricesB i,b i
The main difficulty in the first step is to prove that the number of single-input elements in the decomposition is polynomial.
In the second part, Sim simulates the value of every single-input element separately. The main idea in this step is to show that the value of a single-input element for input x can be simulated only given C(x). To this end, we use Kilian's proof on randomized encoding of branching programs. Unfortunately, we cannot simulate all the single-input elements at once (given oracle access to C), since their values may not be independent; in particular, they all depend on the obfuscator's randomness. Instead, we show that it is enough to zero test every single-input element individually. More concretely, we show that from every single input element that the adversary can construct, it is possible to factor out a product of the α i,b i
We also show that every single-input element depends on a different set of the α i,b i 1 ,b i 2 variables. Since the values of the α variables are chosen at random by the obfuscation, it is unlikely that the adversary makes a query where the value of two single-input elements "cancel each other" and result in a zero. Therefore, with high probability an element is zero iff it decomposes into single-input element's that are all zero individually.
Decomposition to single-input elements. Next we show that every element can be decomposed into polynomial number of single-input elements. We start by introducing some notation.
For every element e we assign an input-profile prof(e) ∈ {0, 1, * } ∪ {⊥}. Intuitively, if we think of e as an intermediate element in the evaluation of the branching program on some input x, the input-profile prof(e) represents the partial information that can be inferred about x based on the formal variables that appear in the value of e. Formally, for every element e and for every j ∈ [ ], we say that the j'th bit of e's input-profile is consistent with the value b ∈ {0, 1} if e has a basic sub-element e such that S(e ) = S(i, b 1 , b 2 ) and either j = inp 1 (i) and b 1 = b, or j = inp 2 (i) and b 2 = b.
For every j ∈ [ ] and for b ∈ {0, 1} we set prof(e) j = b if the j'th bit of e's input-profile is consistent with b but not with 1 − b. If the j'th bit of e's input-profile is not consistent with either 0 or 1 then prof(e) j = * . If there exist j ∈ [ ] such that the j'th bit of e's input-profile is consistent with both 0 and 1, then prof(e) = ⊥. In this case we say that e is not a single-input element and that it's profile is invalid. If prof(e) = ⊥ then we say that e is a single-input element. We say that an input-profile is complete if it is in {0, 1} .
Next we describe an algorithm D used by Sim to decompose elements into single-input elements. Given an input element e, D outputs a set of single-input elements with distinct input-profiles such that e = s∈D(e) s, where the equality between the elements means that their values compute the same function (it does not mean that the arithmetic circuits that represent these values are identical). Note that the above requirement implies that for every s ∈ D(e), S(s) = S(e).
The decomposition algorithm D is defined recursively, as follows:
• If the input element e is basic, D outputs the singleton set {e}.
• If the input element e is of the form e 1 +e 2 , D executes recursively and obtains the set L = D(e 1 )∪D(e 2 ).
If there exist elements s 1 , s 2 ∈ L with the same input-profile, D replaces the two elements with a single element s 1 + s 2 . D repeats this process until all the input-profiles in L are distinct and outputs L.
• If the input element e is of the form e 1 ·e 2 , D executes recursively and obtains the sets
For every s 1 ∈ L 1 and s 2 ∈ L 2 , D adds the expression s 1 · s 2 to the output set L. D then eliminates repeating input-profiles from L as described above, and outputs L.
The fact that in the above decomposition algorithm indeed e = s∈D(e) s, and that the input profiles are distinct follows from a straightforward induction. The usefulness of the above decomposition algorithm is captured by the following two claims: Claim 1. If U ⊆ S(e) then all the elements in D(e) are single-input elements. Namely, for every s ∈ D(e) we have that prof(s) = ⊥. Claim 2. D runs in polynomial time, and in particular, the number of elements in the output decomposition is polynomial.
Intuition. The key to proving the claims is to argue about the structure of the input element e. The index sets for the basic elements given in the construction are carefully chosen so that the element e can only be constructed in a very specific way. Roughly, we show that the only way to construct an element, is to first combine basic elements using multiplication to create elements with complete input-profiles, and then to combine these single-input elements together using addition gates 7 . More concretely, our first observation is that the only way to create an element that contains a "new" input profile (that is, an element e such that D(e) contains a profile that does not appear in the decomposition of sub-elements of e) is using a multiplication gate. The reason is that for an element e of the form e 1 + e 2 , the set of input profiles in D(e) is simply the union of the sets of input profiles in D(e 1 ) and D(e 2 ).
To prove Claim 1, we show that if e 1 and e 2 have valid profiles but the profile of e = e 1 · e 2 is invalid then e can never be a sub-element of an element with index set U , and thus, computations involving e can never be zero tested. The idea is show that S(e) together with the index set of all other elements given to the adversary cannot form an exact cover of U . This follows from the properties of the straddling set system used (see Definition 5).
To prove Claim 2, we show that if e is an element of the form e 1 · e 2 and D(e) contains a new input-profile then e must itself be a single-input element (that is, D(e) will be the singleton set {e}). This means that the number of elements in the decomposition of e is bounded by the number of sub-elements of e, and therefore is polynomial. To prove the above we first observe that if D(e) is not a singleton, then either D(e 1 ) or D(e 2 ) are also not singletons. Then we show that if D(e 1 ) contains more than one input-profile then all input-profiles in D(e 1 ) must be complete (here again we use the structure of the straddling set system used) and therefore the multiplication e 1 · e 2 cannot contain any new profiles.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume towards contradiction that the claim is false. Let e bad be the "first" sub-element of e such that D(e bad ) contains an element with an invalid input-profile. Namely, suppose that D(e bad ) contains an element with an invalid input-profile, but the decomposition of all sub-elements of e bad contain only elements with valid input-profiles.
Note that e bad cannot be basic since then it's input-profile is valid and D(e bad ) is the singleton set e bad . Moreover, note that e bad cannot be of the form e 1 + e 2 , since in this case, the input-profile of every element in D(e bad ) appears also in D(e 1 ) or in D(e 2 ), contradicting the assumption on e bad . Therefore, it must be the case that e bad is of the form e 1 · e 2 . By the definition of e bad , there must exist s 1 ∈ D(e 1 ) and s 2 ∈ D(e 2 ) such that prof(s 1 ) = ⊥ and prof(s 2 ) = ⊥ but prof(s 1 · s 2 ) = ⊥. Therefore, WLOG there exists j ∈ [ ] such that prof(s 1 ) j = 0 and prof(s 2 ) j = 1. In next prove the following two claims, which we use to derive a contradiction to the definition of the set system S j , by showing an exact cover of U j that is not one of the two covers specified in Definition 5. 
Claim 4. If e is a sub-element of e and C ⊆ S j is an exact cover of S(e ) ∩ U j then there exists an exact cover C ⊆ S j of S(e) ∩ U j such that C ⊆ C.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. If e is of the form e 1 + e 2 and C 1 ⊆ S j is an exact cover of S(e 1 ) ∩ U j then C 1 is also an exact cover of S(e) ∩ U j since S(e) = S(e 1 ). Similarly, if e is an element of the form e 1 · e 2 and C 1 , C 2 ⊆ S j are exact covers of S(e 1 ) ∩ U j and S(e 2 ) ∩ U j , respectively, then since S(e 1 ) ∩ S(e 2 ) = ∅ and since S(e 1 ) = S(e 1 ) ∪ S(e 2 ) then C 1 ∪ C 2 is and exact cover of S(e) ∩ U j .
Since prof(s 1 ) j = 0 and prof(s 2 ) j = 1, it follows from Claims 3 and 4 that there exists an exact cover of S(s 1 ) ∩ U j that contains the set S j i,0 for some i ∈ ind(j), and there exists an exact cover of S(s 2 ) ∩ U j that contains the set S j i ,1 for some i ∈ ind(j). Since S(s 1 ) = S(e 1 ) and S(s 2 ) = S(e 2 ), and since e bad is of the form e 1 · e 2 , there exists an exact cover of S(e) ∩ U j that contains both S j i,0 and S j i ,1 . Since e bad is a sub-expression of e, it follows from Claim 4 that there exists an exact cover of S(e) ∩ U j that contains both S j i,0 and S j i ,1 . However, since U j ⊆ U ⊆ S(e) we have that S(e) ∩ U j = U j , which implies that that there exists an exact cover of U j that contains both S j i,0 and S j i ,1 . This is a contradiction to the definition of the set system S j (see Definition 5).
Proof of Claim 2. It is straightforward to verify that the running time of D on e is polynomial in the size of the set D(e). We will show that |D(e)| is polynomial by showing that for every s ∈ D(e) there exists a single-input sub-element e of e such that prof(s) = prof(e ). Since the input-profiles in D(e) are distinct, it follows that |D(e)| is bounded by the number of sub-elements of e and is therefore polynomial. Fix some s ∈ D(e). Let e 0 be the "first" sub-element of e such that D(e 0 ) contains an element with the input-profile prof(s). Namely, suppose that D(e 0 ) contains an element with the input-profile prof(s), but the decomposition of every sub-element of e 0 does not contain an element with the input-profile prof(s). If e 0 is basic then it is also a single-input element and we are done, since it implies that prof(e 0 ) = prof(s). Note that e 0 cannot be of the form e 1 + e 2 , since the input-profile of every element in D(e 0 ) appears also in D(e 1 ) or in D(e 2 ), contradicting the assumption on e 0 . Therefore, assuming e 0 is not basic, it must be the case that e 0 is of the form e 1 · e 2 . In what follows, we prove that in this case, e 0 is a single-input sub-element of e (i.e., that |D(e 0 )| = 1). This would immediately imply that prof(s) = prof(e 0 ), as desired.
To this end, assume towards contradiction that |D(e 0 )| > 1. By the definition of D, and by the assumption that e 0 = e 1 · e 2 , it must be the case that either |D(e 1 )| > 1 or |D(e 2 )| > 1. Assume WLOG that |D(e 1 )| > 1. Let s 0 ∈ D(e 0 ) such that prof(s) = prof(s 0 ), and let s 1 ∈ D(e 1 ) and s 2 ∈ D(e 2 ) be elements such that s 0 = s 1 · s 2 . The fact that |D(e 1 )| > 1 implies that there exists s 1 ∈ D(e 1 ) such that s 1 = s 1 . Note that S(s 1 ) = S(s 1 ) = S(e 1 ). The fact that the input-profiles in D(e) are distinct implies that there must exist some j ∈ [ ] such that prof(s 1 ) j = prof(s 1 ) j . Assume WLOG that prof(s 1 ) j = 1 and that prof(s 1 ) j ∈ {0, * }.
If prof(s 1 ) j = * then for every sub-element e of s 1 we have S(e )∩U j = ∅, and therefore also S(s 1 )∩U j = ∅. On the other hand, since prof(s 1 ) j = 1, it follows from Claim 3 that there exists a sub-element e of s 1 such that S(e ) ∩ U j = ∅ and therefore also S(s 1 ) ∩ U j = ∅, contradicting the fact that S(s 1 ) = S(s 1 ).
If prof(s 1 ) j = 0, then the fact that prof(s 1 ) j = 1, together with Claims 3 and 4, implies that there exists an exact cover of S(s 1 ) ∩ U j that contains the set S j i,1 for some i ∈ ind(j), and there exists an exact cover of S(s 1 ) ∩ U j that contains the set S j i ,0 for some i ∈ ind(j). The fact that S(s 1 ) = S(s 1 ) implies that S(s 1 )∩U j = S(s 1 )∩U j , which together with Definition 5 (for the set system S j ), implies that S(s 1 )∩U j = U j . We conclude the proof with the following claim, showing that the fact that U j ⊆ S(s 1 ) implies that prof(s 1 ) is complete.
8 If s 1 's profile is complete, multiplying it with another element cannot change its profile (without making it invalid) and therefore prof(s 0 ) = prof(s 1 · s 2 ) = prof(s 1 ), contradicting our assumption on e 0 .
We prove the following stronger claim (that will be used also in the second part of the proof):
Claim 5. Let s be a single-input element. If U j ⊆ S(s) then:
1. prof(s) is complete.
2. For every i ∈ ind(j), there exists a basic sub-element e i of s such that S(e i ) = S(i, b Proof. The fact that s is a single-input element, implies that prof(s) = ⊥. Moreover, prof(s) j = * , since otherwise, every sub-element e of s satisfies S(e ) ∩ U j = ∅, and therefore also S(s) ∩ U j = ∅, contradicting the assumption that U j ⊆ S(s).
By the definition of prof(s), together with our assumption that prof(s) = ⊥, if there exists a sub-element e of s such that S(e ) ∩ U j = S j i ,b for some i ∈ ind(j), then b = prof(s) j . Thus, the fact that U j ⊆ S(s) implies that for every i ∈ ind(j) there exists a basic sub-element e i of s that satisfies S(e i )∩U j = S j i,b for b = prof(s) j . In particular, since e i is basic it must be the case that S(e i ) = S(i, b 1 , b 2 ) for (b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ {0, 1}. This, together with the fact that prof(s) = ⊥, implies that it must be the case that (b 1 , b 2 ) = (prof(s) inp 1 (i) , prof(s) inp 2 (i) ). This proves Item 2 of Claim 5. Similarly, the fact that prof(s) = ⊥, implies that for every basic sub-element e of s, if S(e) = S(i, b 1 , b 2 ) then (b 1 , b 2 ) = (prof(s) inp 1 (i) , prof(s) inp 2 (i) ), which proves Item 3 of Claim 5.
It remains to prove that prof(s) is complete. To this end, fix any j ∈ [ ]. By our assumption on the structure of the branching program, there exists i ∈ [n] such that {inp 1 (i), inp 2 (i)} = {j, j }. Assume WLOG that (inp 1 (i), inp 2 (i)) = (j, j ). The fact inp 1 (i) = j implies in particular that i ∈ ind(j), and there exist sub-element e i of s such that S(e i ) = S(i, b 1 , b 2 ). Since inp 2 (i) = j , we also have prof(s) j = * . This is true for every j ∈ [ ], and therefore prof(s) is complete.
In the rest of the proof, we use the decomposition algorithm D to simulation zero-test queries. To this end, we use the simulation technique of Kilian for randomized branching programs, described in the following theorem:
). There exists an efficient simulation algorithm Sim BP such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} ,
Simulating zero tests. For every element e, let p e denote the the polynomial describing the value of e as a function of its formal variables, that is, the polynomial computed by the circuit α(e). For a zero-test query containing an element e with S(e) = U ∪ B s ∪ B t , Sim answers as follows.
1. Sim obtains the decomposition of e into single-input elements D(e) and repeats the following for every s ∈ D(e).
(a) Sim queries its C oracle on x prof(s), and obtains C(x).
(b) Sim executes the randomized branching program simulator Sim BP on input C(x) and obtains the matrices:
(c) Sim samples uniformly random values for:
and obtains an assignment V sim s to all the formal variables that s may depend on. Note that s may not depend on theB matrices that where not generated by Sim BP (C(x)). We think of V Intuition. The idea behind the above simulation is that every single-input element is simulated and zero tested individually. To prove that the simulation is correct, we must show that it is unlikely that e evaluates to zero as a result of cancelations between two (or more) non-zero single-input elements. The first step in the proof (proven in Claim 6) is to show that every single-input element in D(e) can be represented as a product of the α i,b i 1 ,b i 2 variables and an expression that does not depend on the α's. We also show that every single-input element depends on a different set of the α i,b i
Since the values of the α variables are chosen at random by the obfuscation, it follows that with high probability the value of e is zero iff the value of all the single-input elements in D(e) are also zero.
In the second step of the proof we show how to decide whether the value of a single-input element is zero. First we show that by making one oracle call to C, Sim can perfectly simulate the value of a single-input element (Claim 7). Then we show that the value of every single-input element can be expressed as a low degree polynomial in the obfuscation random variables, and therefore it is either zero with probability 1, or only with negligible probability (Claim 8). It follows that by simulating the value of a single-input element and testing if it is zero we get the correct answer with overwhelming probability.
Correctness of the simulation. Next we prove that the simulation of zero-test queries is statistically close to the distribution in the real world. Formally, let V real C be the random variable representing the values of the initial elements that O(C) gives the the oracle M during the initiation phase (we think of V real C as an assignment to the variables of the polynomial p e ). We require that for every element e such that S(e) = U ∪ B s ∪ B t , the probability that Sim answers that e is zero is negligibly close to the probability that p e (V real C ) = 0. Since the adversary only asks a polynomial number of zero test queries, the correctness of the entire simulation follows.
We start by proving a claim on the structure of p e :
Claim 6. For every element e such that U ⊆ S(e) we have that:
Where for every single-input element s ∈ D(e):
2. q prof(s) is a polynomial in the variabless,t and in the entries of the matricesB i,b i
where the individual degree in every variable is 1.
Proof. By the properties of the decomposition algorithm D we have that:
Next we argue about the structure of p s for s ∈ D(e). Recall that we think of the value of s, denoted by α(s), as an arithmetic circuit. Thus, we can represent α(s) as a (potentially exponential) sum of monomials. We denote the elements corresponding to these monomials by s k . Namely, we represent s as k s k , such that the following holds:
1. The basic sub-elements of each s k are a subset of the basic sub-elements of s.
2. Each α(s k ) contains only multiplication gates.
3. For every s k we have that S(s k ) = S(s) and therefore U j ⊂ S(s k ) for every j ∈ [ ].
By Claim 5, prof(s k ) is complete, and since every basic sub-element of s k is also a basic sub-elements of s we have that prof(s k ) = prof(s). It also follows from Claim 5 that for every i ∈ [ ], there exists a basic sub-element e i of s k such that S(e i ) = S(i, b Proof. By Theorem 2, the distributions of the following variables generated by Sim and by O(C) are identical:
Additionally, the following variables are sampled uniformly at random both by Sim and by O(C):
The claim follows from the fact that the assignment V sim s generated by Sim and the assignment to the same subset of variables in V real C are both computed from the above values in the same manner.
Next we prove the correctness of the zero-test simulation. Let the input to the zero-test be an element e such that S(e) = U ∪ B s ∪ B t . We say that p e (V is uniform, it follows from the structure of p e (given by Claim 6) and from the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, that for every s ∈ D(e) it holds that q prof(s) (V real C ) ≡ 0, and therefore that p s (V real C ) ≡ 0. By Claim 7 we have that also p s (V sim s ) ≡ 0 for every s ∈ D(e) and therefore Sim answers that e is zero with probability 1.
In the case where p e (V real C ) ≡ 0 we will make use of the following claim: Claim 8. For every element e such that p e is a polynomial of degree poly(n), if p e (V real C ) ≡ 0 then:
Proof. If V real C where uniformly distributed in Z p , or if they could be expressed as polynomials of degree at most w over values that are uniform in Z p , then the claim would have followed directly from the SchwartzZippel lemma. However, the assignment V real C depends both on the R i matrices and on their inverses, and we cannot express the entries of R 
Since the R i matrices are chosen to be invertible, and since by Claim 6, the individual degree of p e in the entries of R −1 i is 1, we have that:
Where p e is another polynomial that depends on p e . Since det(R i ) can be expressed as a polynomial of degree w in the entries of R i , it follows that the degree of p e is at most n · w times the degree of p e and therefore the degree of p e is bounded by poly(n). Now, since the entries of adj(R i ) can be expressed as polynomials of degree w in the entries of R i , we have that all values in the assignmentṼ Going back to the case wehre p e (V real C ) ≡ 0, it follows from the structure of p e (given by Claim 6) that there exists s ∈ D(e) such that p s (V real C ) ≡ 0. By Claim 8, we have that p s (V real C ) = 0 with overwhelming probability and by Claim 7, p s (V sim s ) = 0 with the same probability. Therefore, Sim answers that e is non-zero with overwhelming probability, as desired. 
B Amplifying to Poly-sized Circuit VBB Obfuscation
In this section we show how to realize VBB obfuscation for arbitrary poly-sized circuits using a VBB obfuscator for circuits in NC 1 and an FHE scheme. The construction presented here follows directly from the construction presented by [GGH + 13b].
B.1 Preliminaries
Here we will recall two primitives: FHE and low-depth proofs, as in [GGH + 13b].
Fully Homomorphic Encryption [Gen09] . Our definitions here follow [BGV12] . A fully-homomorphic encryption scheme FHE is a tuple of PPT algorithms (FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Dec, FHE.Eval). The message space R M of FHE is some ring and our computational model will be arithmetic circuits over this ring (with addition and multiplication gates). FHE.KeyGen takes the security parameter (and possibly other parameters of the scheme output by a Setup procedure) and outputs a secret key sk and a public key pk. FHE.Enc takes the public key pk a message µ and outputs a ciphertext c that encrypts µ. FHE.Dec takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message µ. FHE.Eval takes the public key pk, an arithmetic circuit f over M , and ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c , where is the number of inputs to f , and outputs a ciphertext c f .
Definition 7. We say that a homomorphic encryption perfectly correctly evaluates a circuit family F if for all f ∈ F and for all µ 1 , . . . , µ ∈ R M it holds that if sk, pk were properly generated by FHE.KeyGen with security parameter λ, and if c i = FHE.Enc pk (µ i ) for all i, and c f = FHE.Eval pk (f, c 1 , . . . , c ), then Pr[FHE.Dec sk (c f ) = f (µ 1 , . . . , µ )] = 0 , where the probability is taken over all the randomness in the experiment.
Furthermore, we assume the decryption algorithm FHE.Dec (as is true with most known FHE schemes) can be realized by a family of circuits in NC 1 . We use standard semantic security (security under chosen plaintext attack) as our security notion.
Definition 8. A homomorphic scheme is secure if any polynomial time adversary that first gets a properly generated pk, then specifies µ 0 , µ 1 ∈ R M and finally gets FHE.Enc pk (µ b ) for a random b, cannot guess the value of b with probability > 1/2 + negl(λ).
Low Depth Proofs. Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs (x, w) ∈ R we call x the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R. A non-interactive proof with perfect completeness and perfect soundness for a relation R consists of an (efficient) prover P and a verifier V such that:
Perfect completeness. A proof system is perfectly complete if an honest prover with a valid witness can always convince an honest verifier. For all (x, w) ∈ R we have Pr π ← P (x, w) : V (x, π) = 1 = 1.
Perfect soundness. A proof system is perfectly sound if it is infeasible to convince an honest verifier when the statement is false. For all x / ∈ L and all (even unbounded) adversaries A we have Pr π ← A(x) : V (x, π) = 1 = 0.
Furthermore we say that a non-interactive proof is low-depth, if the verifier V can be implemented in NC 1 . We refer the reader to [GGH + 13b, Appendix B.4] for a simple construction of a low-depth non-interactive proof.
B.2 Our Construction
The construction presented here is a simplification of the [GGH + 13b] scheme and has been taken almost verbatim from there.
Consider a family of circuit classes {C λ } for λ ∈ N where both the input size, n = n(λ), is a polynomial function of λ and the maximum circuit size, p(λ) is also a polynomial function of λ. Let {U λ } be a poly-sized universal circuit family for these circuit classes, where U λ (C, m) = C(m) for all C ∈ {C λ } and m ∈ {0, 1}
n . Furthermore, all circuits C ∈ {C λ } can be encoded as an = (λ) bit string as input to U .
We show how to build an a VBB obfuscator for such a circuit class given a VBB obfuscator, for circuits in NC 1 . Our construction is described by an obfuscate algorithm and an evaluation algorithm.
-Obfuscate(1 λ , C ∈ C λ ):
P1
Given input (m, e, φ), P1 (SK F HE ,g) proceeds as follows:
1. Check if φ is a valid low-depth proof for the NP-statement: e = FHE.Eval(PKF HE , U λ (·, m), g).
2. If the check fails output 0; otherwise, output FHE.Dec(e, SKF HE ). 
